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(i) Statistical inference after Neyman–Pearson.
Statistical inference as an alternative to Neyman–
Pearson decision theory has a long history in sta-
tistical thinking, with strong impetus from Fisher’s
research; see, for example, the overview in Fisher
(1956). Some resulting concerns in inference theory
then reached the mathematical statistics community
rather forcefully with Cox (1958); this had focus on
the two measuring-instruments example and on uses
of conditioning that were compelling.
(ii) Birnbaum and logical analysis in statistical in-
ference. Birnbaum (1962) introduced notation for
the statistical inference available from an investiga-
tion with a model and data. This gave grounds to
analyze how different methods or principles might
influence the statistical inference. As part of this he
discussed how sufficiency, likelihood and condition-
ing could differentially affect statistical inference.
Much of his discussion centered on the argument
from conditioning and sufficiency to likelihood, but
a primary consequence was the attention attracted
to conditioning and its role in inference. While this
interest in conditioning was substantial for those
concerned with the core of statistics, it has more
recently been neglected or overlooked. Indeed, some
recent texts, for example, Rice (2007), seem not to
acknowledge conditioning in inference or even the
measuring-instrument example.
(iii) Mayo and statistical principles. Mayo should
be strongly commended for reminding us that the
principles and arguments of statistical inference
deserve very serious consideration and, we might
add, could have very serious consequences (Fraser
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(2014)). Her primary focus is on the argument (Birn-
baum (1962)) that the principles sufficiency and
conditionality lead to the likelihood principle. This
may not cover some recent aspects of condition-
ing (Fraser, Fraser and Staicu (2010)), but should
strongly stimulate renewed interest in conditioning.
(iv) Contemporary inference theory. Many sta-
tistical models have continuity in how parame-
ter change affects observable variables or, more
specifically, how parameter change affects coordi-
nate quantile functions, the inverses of the coordi-
nate distribution functions. This continuity in its
global effect is widely neglected in statistical infer-
ence. If this effect on quantile functions is accepted
and used in the inference procedures, then in wide
generality there is a well-determined conditioning
(Fraser, Fraser and Staicu (2010)). And likelihood
analysis then offers an exponential model approxi-
mation that is third-order equivalent to the given
model, and this in turn provides third-order infer-
ence for any scalar component parameters of in-
terest. Thus, the familiar conditioning conflicts are
routinely avoided by acknowledging the important
model continuity.
(v) What is available? The conditioning just de-
scribed leads routinely to p-value functions p(ψ)
for any scalar component parameter ψ = ψ(θ) of
the statistical model. A wealth of statistical infer-
ence methodology then immediately becomes avail-
able from such p-value functions. For example, a
test for a value ψ0 is given by the p-value p(ψ0),
a confidence interval by the inverse (ψˆβ/2, ψˆ1−β/2) =
p−1(1−β/2, β/2) of the p-value function, and a me-
dian estimate by the value p−1(0.5). But quite gen-
erally the needed p-value functions are not available
from a likelihood function alone!
(vi) What are the implications? If continuity is in-
cluded as an ingredient of many model-data combi-
nations, then, as we have indicated, likelihood anal-
ysis produces p-values and confidence intervals, and
these are not available from the likelihood func-
tion alone. This thus demonstrates that with such
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continuity-based conditioning the likelihood princi-
ple is not a consequence of sufficiency and condition-
ing principles. But if we omit the continuity then we
are directly faced with the issue addressed by Mayo.
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